

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 155191

NODIS

FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FOLLOWING REPEAT TEL AVIV 4821 SENT ACTION SECSTATE 02 JUL 77

QUOTE S E C R E T TEL AVIV 4821

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, IS, US

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN ON U.S.-ISRAELI
RELATIONS AND BEGIN TRIP

SUMMARY:

I CONVEYED TO DAYAN SOME OF THE BACKGROUND
TO THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 27, NOTING
THAT FROM RECENT BEGIN AND DAYAN REMARKS WASHINGTON
HAD RECEIVED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE GOI WAS REINTERPRETING 242.

I ADDED THAT WASHINGTON IS MOST ANXIOUS FOR A SUCCESSFUL
BEGIN VISIT AND THAT THE PRESIDENT EXPECTED BEGIN

TO GET DOWN TO SPECIFICS. I NOTED THE
URGENCY WE ATTACHED TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND SAID

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THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD RETURN TO THE AREA SOON
AFTER BEGIN'S VISIT.

DAYAN THOUGHT THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT
UNFAIR; IT HAD MISREPRESENTED HIS REMARKS. IN FACT, HE HAS
NO PRECONDITIONS ON NEGOTIATIONS OR THEIR OUTCOME.
HIS READINESS TO GO TO GENEVA MEANS THE SAME AS IT

MEANT WHEN DECLARED BY THE MEIR AND RABIN GOVERNMENTS.
HE ASSURED ME THAT HE KNEW NOTHING OF THE JAVITS'
SPEECH BEFOREHAND AND WANTED TO DISABUSE US OF ANY
SUSPICION THAT ISRAEL WAS PLAYING FOR TIME. HIS
GOVERNMENT AND HE PERSONALLY AGREE THAT NOW IS THE TIME
FO MOVE FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT. THOUGH I EXPLAINED
THE CONSTRAINTS THAT DICTATED A VANCE TRIP IMMEDIATELY
AFTER BEGIN'S, DAYAN QUESTIONED ITS ADVISABILITY SO
SOON AND INDICATED HIS PREFERENCE FOR WASHINGTON AS
A VENUE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. DAYAN FOREWARNED THAT HE
CANNOT CALL A TOTAL MORATORIUM ON DISCUSSION HERE OF JUDEA
AND SAMARIA AND SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CANNOT
DO LESS THAN THE PREVIOUS ONE ON SETTLEMENT
ACTIVITIES. I REPLIED THAT ANY NEW
SETTLEMENTS WOULD BE DISRUPTIVE TO NEGOTIATIONS
AND URGED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY BE
AVOIDED WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROSPECT.
END SUMMARY

1. I MET WITH FONMIN DAYAN FOR AN EXTENDED COVERSAATION
JUNE 30 TO REVIEW RECENT EVENTS, CONVEY SOME IMPRESSIONS
FROM MY TRIP TO WASHINGTON, AND DISCUSS THE BEGIN TRIP.
IT WAS A FRANK AND FRIENDLY SESSION, THOUGH NOT WITHOUT
MOMENTS OF CONSIDERABLE EMOTION ON DAYAN'S PART. HE
REPORTED ON IT IN DETAIL TO BEGIN YESTERDAY MORNING IN
EVRON'S PRESENCE. I WAS WITH BEGIN LATER AT LARGE
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LUNCHEON GIVEN IN MY HONOR BY ISRAEL-AMERICA FRIENDSHIP
SOCIETY (WHERE BEGIN DELIVERED AN EXTRAORDINARILY ELOQUENT
TRIBUTE TO THE UNITED STATES), AND BEGIN TOLD ME HE WAS
VERY PLEASED BY THE REPORT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM DAYAN
ABOUT OUR MEETING.

2. WE AGREED I WOULD SEE BEGIN ALONE NEXT WEEK, PROBABLY
ON THURSDAY, JULY 7. ANY SPECIAL INTRUCTIONS FOR THAT
MEETING SHOULD REACH ME BY COB HERE JULY 6.

3. I BEGAN CONVERSATION WITH DAYAN BY REVIEWING GENERAL
WASHINGTON SCENE I ENCOUNTERED LAST WEEK, AND DESCRIBING
WHAT I KNEW OF THE BACKGROUND OF THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESS
STATEMENT OF JUNE 27. I SAID I HAD FOUND THE ATMOSPHERE
ON ARRIVAL WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, TO HAVE BEEN POSITIVE.
THERE HAD BEEN A CLEAR PREFERENCE TO AVOID FURTHER
PUBLIC EXCHANGES WITH ISRAELI LEADERS ON SENSITIVE ISSUES
UNTIL AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S
INITIAL SPEECH TO THE KNESSET HAD BEEN VERY WELL RECEIVED
BY U.S. OFFICIALS. IT WAS VIEWED AS A STATESMANLIKE,
DIGNIFIED ADDRESS. THE FOLLOWING DAY, HOWEVER,
(THURSDAY) PRESS REPORTS BEGAN FILTERING IN ON SOME PUBLIC

REMARKS BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND ON DAYAN'S TALK TO FOREIGN MINISTRY EMPLOYEES. ABOUT THE SAME TIME, I SAID, CONCERN ABOUT THE TENOR OF A PROJECTED SPEECH BY SENATOR JAVITS BEGAN TO DEVELOP. ONCE THE TEXT BECAME AVAILABLE, IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESS SPOKESMAN WOULD BE ASKED TO COMMENT ON IT -- AND CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE WAS UNDER PREPARATION WHEN I LEFT WASHINGTON ON SATURDAY, JUNE 25.

4. I SAID THAT FROM APPARENTLY SOMEWHAT INACCURATE REPORTS OF BEGIN'S AND DAYAN'S REMARKS, THE ADMINISTRATION RECEIVED AN IMPRESSION THAT BEGIN'S AND DAYAN'S WORDS TAKEN TOGETHER WERE IN EFFECT REINTERPRETING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242. IT WAS DECIDED THEREFORE IT
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WAS ESSENTIAL TO RESTATE CLEARLY THE U.S. INTERPRETATION OF 242 SO AS NOT TO MISLEAD ANYONE, AND THE RESTATEMENT WAS INCLUDED IN THE PRESS GUIDANCE PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO THE JAVITS SPEECH.

5. I THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT EVERYONE IN WASHINGTON IN ANXIOUS TO HAVE A FRUITFUL, SUCCESSFUL VISIT. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE WARM AND HOSPITABLE IN WELCOMING THE PRIME MINISTER. HE WILL WANT TO HEAR BEGIN'S VIEWS, BUT HE WILL ALSO EXPECT BEGIN TO GET DOWN TO SPECIFICS, ON ALL ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM, AN EXPECTATION I KNEW SECRETARY VANCE HAD ALREADY CLEARLY CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR DINITZ. (INTERESTINGLY, DAYAN INTERJECTED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE DINITZ HAD MENTIONED THIS.) THE PRESIDENT WILL WANT TO KNOW ISRAEL'S PRIORITIES, FOR EXAMPLE, AMONG THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS IN POST-SETTLEMENT PEACEFUL RELATIONSHIPS. THERE IS NO PREDISPOSITION IN WASHINGTON TO ASSUME THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL WILL NOT WORK CLOSELY. BUT, I WENT ON, THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN THINKING LONG AND HARD REGARDING THE PEACE PROCESS AND BELIEVES IT IS VITAL THAT MOVEMENT TOWARD AN EARLY GENEVA CONFERENCE BE CONTINUOUS.

6. I THEN SAID THAT SECRETARY VANCE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST SOON AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT -- PERHAPS ARRIVING IN THE AREA ABOUT JULY 28, FOR PERHAPS SEVEN TO TEN DAYS. HE HAD INFORMED DINITZ THAT HE WOULD COME TO ISRAEL FIRST. HIS PURPOSE OF COURSE WOULD BE TO TRY TO REFINE THE ELEMENTS OF THE PREPARATORY NEGOTIATING PROCESS AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR GENEVA.

7. I THEN SAID THAT IN THE SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND CANDOR WHICH CHARACTERIZES U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS, I WANTED TO TELL DAYAN OF ANOTHER ELEMENT WHICH I PERSONALLY
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SENSED WAS INVOLVED IN THE EVENTS LEADING UP TO MONDAY'S PRESS STATEMENT. I SAID IT WAS PURELY INTUITION, BUT THAT I BELIEVED THE PRESIDENT MAY HAVE FELT HE WAS BEING CROWDED BY EVENTS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS; THAT BEGIN, DAYAN AND JAVITS HAD SOMEHOW COORDINATED THEIR MOVES AS AN OPENING SALVO IN MOUNTING A BROAD ATTACK ON THE ADMINISTRATION'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY. DAYAN INTERJECTED TO DENY ABSOLUTELY ANY COORDINATION OR INDEED ANY FORE-KNOWLEDGE WHATEVER OF JAVITS SPEECH. I THEN REMARKED THAT I WAS VERY PLEASED AT THE LOW-KEY RESPONSE BY THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S SPOKESMAN, ANDNHOPE WE COULD NOW MOVE ON.

8. DAYAN BEGAN HIS REPLY TO MY INITIAL REMARKS BY UNDERLINING HIS REAL DISTRESS WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT IT HAD BEEN UNFAIR; IT HAD PUT WORDS INTO HIS MOUTH. WHY DID WE NOT ASK IMMEDIATELY FOR A TEXT INSTEAD OF RELYING UPON PRESS REPORTS? WHAT HE DID SAY WAS THAT IF HE HAD TO MAKE A PROPOSAL, HE WOULD NOT SUGGEST DIVIDING THE AREA (WEST BANK) BUT THAT THE TWO PEOPLES SHOULD LEARN TO LIVE TOGETHER. HE NEVER MENTIONED ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK BY ISRAEL, SAYING ONLY THAT HE OPPOSED ANNEXATION BY JORDAN. IN FACT, HE HAS NO PRECONDITIONS AS TO THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS. REGARDING THE INTERPRETATION OF 242: ON THE NIGHT THE GOVERNMENT WAS INVESTED DAYAN HAD SOUGHT OUT BEGIN ON THE FLOOR OF THE KNESSET TO TELL HIM THAT HE WAS GOING TO INFORM THE KNESSET THAT THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT REGARDS 242 AND ALL UNDERTAKINGS BY PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS AS BINDING UPON IT. BEGIN AGREED TO DAYAM'S SAYING SO, AND THIS IS THE GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC, OFFICIAL POSITION. AS A MATTER OF FACT, DAYAN SAID, YADIN PLAINATIVELY ASKED IN HIS KNESSET SPEECH WHY BEGIN HAD NOT MADE THIS POINT IN HIS COALITION NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DMC. DAYAN SAID THAT WHAT HIS GOVERNMENT MEANS BY BEING PREPARED TO GO TO GENEVA IS THE SAME AS WHAT THE GOLDA MEIR AND RABIN

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GOVERNMENTS MEANT. DAYAN REPEATED THAT WHAT HAD ANNOYED HIM MOST ABOUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT WAS OUR GOING AHEAD BEFORE OBTAINING PRIVATELY FROM HIM A CLARIFICATION OF HIS REMARKS, AND HE AGAIN INSISTED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW BEFOREHAND OF THE JAVITS' SPEECH. DAYAN ADDED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC TERRITORY ISSUES WAS THE WAY TO NEGOTIATE.

9. DAYAN SAID THAT A VERY WELL-KNOWN PERSONALITY IN THE U.S. HAD TOLD HIM THAT THE MONDALE SPEECH AND THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT, IF IMPLEMENTED, WOULD SPELL THE END OF ISRAEL. THIS PERSON FEARS THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE DEPARTMENT DO NOT REALLY APPRECIATE THE DIRE IMPLICATIONS FOR ISRAEL OF THEIR PRONOUNCEMENTS ON MIDDLE EAST POLICY. DAYAN NOTED THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT IS VAGUE ON PEACE AND ON GUARANTEES FOR ISRAEL. IF THIS IS THE SHAPE OF FUTURE AGREEMENTS--FOR EXAMPLE, EQUAL DEMILITARIZED ZONES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER--IT WILL MEAN THE EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. DAYAN DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT OR ANYONE IN THE DEPARTMENT WANTS THIS. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL THIS HAD COME UP EVEN BEFORE BEGIN HAD A CHANCE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES IN WASHINGTON. (I INTERJECTED SEVERAL STRONG CAVEATS OF REASSURANCE ABOUT OUR TOTAL COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL'S ULTIMATE SECURITY, AND STRESSED THOSE PARTS OF THE MONDALE SPEECH AND THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT WHICH EMPHASIZE THE NECESSITY FOR THE PARTIES THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATE ACCEPTABLE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT.)

10. DAYAN THEN SAID THAT THREE ELEMENTS IN THE STATEMENT BOTHERED HIM: (A) BORDERS, (B) HOMELAND, AND (C) SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. I AGAIN SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO DRAWING
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BORDERS, THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT THE PARTIES, OBVIOUSLY INCLUDING ISRAEL, WOULD HAVE TO NEGOTIATE. DAYAN DEMURRED, SAYING THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD APPARENTLY BE DRAWN UP BY OTHERS, PLACED BEFORE THE ISRAELIS AND THEY WOULD BE EXPECTED TO SIGN. THIS, HE HIMSELF, WOULD NOT DO. RE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, DAYAN SAID THAT THESE COULD NOT BE RELIED UPON.

11. AT THIS POINT, DAYAN SAID WITH CONSIDERABLE FORCE THAT HE WANTED TO DISABUSE US OF ANY SUSPICION THAT ISRAEL WAS PLAYING FOR TIME. IN DAYAN'S PERSONAL VIEW, THIS IS THE BEST OPPORTUNITY IN THE LAST 30 YEARS FOR OBTAINING AN AGREEMENT. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MOVE TOWARD PEACE AND NOT JUST GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF MOTION, DAYAN SAID. I RESPONDED THAT I WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR THIS, PARTLY BECAUSE THIS IS WHAT I HAD SAID TO VARIOUS OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON--THAT I BELIEVED THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT WOULD ALSO SHOW A SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT GETTING NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. DAYAN THEN SAID THAT ANOTHER VIEW SHARED BY THE U.S. AND ISRAEL IS THE DESIRE TO GO FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT AND NOT FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENTS. DAYAN SAID HE WOULD CONVEY TO THE PRIME

MINISTER THE U.S. EXPECTATION THAT HE BE VERY SPECIFIC IN HIS WASHINGTON DISCUSSIONS. I SAID THAT IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. NEGOTIATING CONCEPT IS NOT ONE THAT ISRAEL WILL ACCEPT, THEN BEGIN SHOULD BE READY TO PROPOSE CONCRETE, REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES. WHAT THE U.S IS TRYING TO DO IS TO LAUNCH A PROCESS AND WE HOPE BEGIN WILL HAVE IDEAS OF HIS OWN TO GIVE IT MOMENTUM.

12. DAYAN THEN SAID HE HAD SOME QUESTION ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF A VANCE TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST RIGHT ON THE HEELS OF THE BEGIN VISIT. FROM HIS PAST EXPERIENCE, HE HAD FOUND A MORE RELAXED ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS IN WASHINGTON, AND WONDERED IF THENEXT PHASE MIGHT NOT BETTER BE THERE. OR IF A TRIP

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WERE HELD, WOULD NOT LATER IN THE SUMMER BE PREFERABLE. I LISTED THE FOLLOWING REASONS AS REQUIRING AN EARLY VANCE TRIP: (A) THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS EXPECT TO HEAR SOMETHING SOON; (B) RAMADAN BEGINS IN MID-AUGUST; (C) VANCE MUST GO TO CHINA IN LATE AUGUST; AND (D) VANCE WOULD HAVE TO ATTEND THE UN GENERALASSEMBLY SHORTLY AFTER HIS RETURN FROM CHINA. THE VANCE TRIP HAS TO OCCUR IN LATE JULY OR EARLY AUGUST OR BE POSTPONED UNTIL OCTOBER; BY THEN THINGS IN THE AREA COULD WELL HAVE SOURED.

13. DAYAN THEN WONDERED HOW BEGIN COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE SPECIFIC WITHOUT MILITARY STAFF AND OTHER EXPERTS ACCOMPANYING HIM. HE DREW THE CONTRAST WITH RABIN WHO WAS A TECHNICIAN AND COULD GO INTO SPECIFICS ON DEFENSE LINES AND TERRITORY WITHOUT REFERRING TO HIS STAFF. I SAID I WAS NOT SUGGESTING THAT BEGIN HAD TO DRAW PRECISE LINES ON A MAP, BUT RATHER SHOULD BE ABLE TO OFFER RATHER PRECISE IDEAS WHAT HE MIGHT BE READY TO DO FOR REAL PEACE ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE WEST BANK. I SAID THAT OF COURSE MORE SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS COULD OCCUR DURING THE VANCE TRIP. HOWEVER, THE MORE SPECIFIC BEGIN COULD BE, THE MORE PRODUCTIVE THE WASHINGTON MEETINGS WOULD BE. I ASSURED DAYAN THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NO INTENTION OF TRYING TO TRAP BEGIN INTO TALKING ABOUT THINGS HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT. I THEN ASKED WHETHER BEGIN WOULD TAKE MOD OR FOREIGN MINISTRY PEOPLE WITH HIM. DAYAN REPLIED THAT THERE MIGHT BE ONE PERSON FROM THE DEFENSE MIRGAUYFK BUT OTHER THAN HIS TWO NEW PERSONAL ASSISTANTS AND EPPY EVRON, THERE IS NO ONE IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT HE COULD AS YET TRUST (TO EXPRESS HIS VIEWS). DAYAN NOTED THAT DINITZ WOULD PROVIDE THE CONTINUITY WITH PREVIOUS MEETINGS. HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT ALL PAST APPROACHES HAD BROUGHT US NOWHERE.

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IN THIS RESPECT, HE AGREED WITH THE PRESIDENT ON THE NEED FOR A FRESH APPROACH.

14. DAYAN AGAIN RETURNED TO HIS WORRY ABOUT A VANCE TRIP SO SOON AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHO WOULD FOLLOW UP ON VANCE IN KEEPING THE MOMENTUM GOING, PARTICULARLY WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES. NOTING THAT HABIB AND AHERTON WOULD ACCOMPANY VANCE, I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS THOUGHT BEING GIVEN TO SETTING UP SOME KIND OF TECHNICAL, PREPARATORY GROUP, PERHAPS IN WASHINGTON, PERHAPS ELSEWHERE. BUT THERE WERE OBVIOUSLY A VARIETY OF OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION.

15. AT THE END OF THIS LONG CONVERSATION, WE RETURNED TO THE PROBLEM OF CREATING THE PROPER ATMOSPHERE FOR THE BEGIN TRIP. I SAID THAT I WAS HONESTLY HOPEFUL ABOUT THE VISIT, PROVIDED MORE PUBLIC SPARRING CAN BE AVOIDED IN THE DAYS AHEAD. I SAID THAT BOTH BEGIN AND CARTER WERE MEN OF DEEP CONVICTIONS, BUT THAT I THOUGHT THEIR PERSONAL RAPPORT SHOULD TURN OUT WELL. HOWEVER, BEGIN WILL HAVE TO BEGIN TO UNDERSTAND CARTER'S PERSPECTIVE ON THE TOTAL MIDDLE EAST PICTURE, AND ITS GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS.

16. DAYAN THEN SAID THAT HE HAD TO BE ABLE TO MENTION JUDEA AND SAMARIA IN PUBLIC WITHOUT HAVING "TO LOOK OVER HIS SHOULDER AT THE UNITED STATES' REACTION," OR TO HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL THE CONCLUSION OF BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. THIS IS HIS COUNTRY, AND JUDEA AND SAMARIA ARE VITAL AND CONSTANT TOPICS. HE SAID TOMORROW (JULY 1ST) FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WILL BE A MEETING CONCERNING NEW SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY. THIS SUBJECT HAS TO BE DISCUSSED. HE DOES NOT WANT TO BE "ASHAMED" TO TALK ABOUT IT. THE SUBJECT COULD NOT BE PUT ON ICE. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD, BUT THAT BECAUSE THE STAKES WERE SO HIGH I HOPED THAT BOTH TALK AND ACTION ON SETTLEMENT POLICY WOULD BE POSTPONED.

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THIS IS AN EXPLOSIVE SUBJECT. BEGIN SHOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS THE TOPIC WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND NOTHING MORE SHOULD HAPPEN UNTIL THAT CONVERSATION. DAYAN SAID THAT ON COMING TO POWER THIS GOVERNMENT FOUND EXTENSIVE SETTLEMENT PLANS DRAWN UP BY THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. HE ASKED WHETHER WASHINGTON THOUGHT IT REALISTIC TO EXPECT BEGIN NOT AT THE VERY LEAST TO CARRY OUT PLANS APPROVED UNDER

RABIN/PERES. I SAID WE DID THINK A MORITORIUM ON SETTLEMENTS WAS NOT ONLY REALISTIC BUT ESSENTIAL. THERE ARE PROPER TIMES TO DO ANYTHING IN LIFE. I KNOW THE U.S. AND ISRAEL WANT NEGOTIATIONS; I WAS CONVINCED THAT MANY ARAB LEADERS WANT NEGOTIATIONS. EVERY NEW SETTLEMENT NOW WOULD BE DISRUPTIVE TOWARD THIS END. I ADDED THAT WE BELIEVE BEGIN CAN POSTPONE SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY, JUST AS HE HAS COMMITTED HIMSELF TO WITHHOLD EXTENDING ISRAELI LAW TO THE WEST BANK WHILE NEGOTIATIONS WERE IN PROGRESS.

17. DAYAN ASKED, AND I PROMISED TO INQUIRE, WHETHER THERE NOW REMAIN FURTHER WASHINGTON QUESTIONS ON HIS POSITION OR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. HE REPEATED AGAIN THAT ALL COMMITMENTS OF PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS REMAIN VALID. EVERYTHING IS NEGOTIABLE AND THERE ARE NO PRE-CONDITIONS AS TO TABLING PROPOSALS, OR, AND HE UNDERScoreD THIS POINT, AS TO THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE WILL NOT REFUSE TO CONSIDER ANYTHING; AND WE WILL TRULY CONSIDER ANYTHING. THIS IS NOT A SEMANTIC GAME, HE SAID. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, ISRAEL CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO DESIST FROM MAKING ITS OWN PROPOSALS. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR ABOUT ONE PARTITION LINE THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ARABS. I ASKED IF HE WAS REFERRING TO THE WEST BANK AND DAYAN REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY; THE OTHER AREAS ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT PROBLEMS.

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18. FINALLY, RETURNING TO AN EARLIER SUBJECT, DAYAN SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD, BUT THAT HE HAD ALWAYS FOUND IT EASIER TO NEGOTIATE IN WASHINGTON. WHENEVER U.S. REPRESENTATIVES HAD COME TO ISRAEL THEY SEEMED RESTRICTED IN THEIR LATITUDE AND UNDER THE PRESSURE OF TIME. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF THE PRESS. IN ISRAEL IT IS UBIQUITOUS, CONSTANTLY NEEDLING FOR DETAILS. THIS SORT OF PRESSURE FROM THE PRESS IS NOT AS PERVASIVE IN WASHINGTON. DAYAN SUGGESTED THAT WE WITHHOLD OUR DECISION ON THE VANCE TRIP UNTIL AFTER THE BEGIN VISIT.

19. DAYAN RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHAT TO TELL THE PRESS UPON MY DEPARTURE. AT HIS SUGGESTION, WE AGREED THAT I WOULD MAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, AND THAT THE AIR HAD BEEN CLEARED. I WOULD ADD THAT THE AGENDA FOR THE BEGIN VISIT WAS ALSO DISCUSSED. I DID SO, AND DAYAN ADDED THAT HE WAS VERY PLEASED WITH THE MEETING.

LEWIS

UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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